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Abstract  
This lecture presents some of the results from the project. The lecture first focuses on 
the broad pattern of inequality in the two countries, and shows its relation to social, 
political and economic forces. It then looks at the dynamics of inequality within the 
labour market; after which it focuses on structural inequalities, in terms of gender, 
race, caste and other factor and finally it assesses how the state tries to modify the 
outcomes in the two countries 
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It’s a privilege to give the V. B. Singh lecture today. Vir Bahadur Singh made large 
academic and intellectual contributions, not least to the Indian Society of Labour 
Economics and to the Indian Journal of Labour Economics. An institution-builder, he 
played an important role in the development of research institutes and universities in 
his home state of Uttar Pradesh, as well as being a significant political actor. His 
writings covered a great deal of ground in international and national development, and 
especially on different aspects of labour. They provide a solid foundation for the topic 
of labour market inequality that I will address today. For instance, he wrote that 
“wages constitute one of the most neglected categories for economic research”, and in 
particular wage differentials. And he was also concerned how “unchanging 
occupational mobility persists like the caste system”. 
 
In this lecture I am going to present some of the results from an unusual research 
project, which brought together a team from the Institute for Human Development 
with a team from the Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning in São Paulo, with 
funding from IDRC. The goal of this project was to shed light on the factors 
determining trends in inequality in the two countries, and in particular trends in labour 
market inequality, and to do it as a collaboration which connected the academic 
traditions of both countries.  So my lecture reflects a team effort.1 
 
I will first discuss the broad pattern of inequality in the two countries, and how it 
connects with social, political and economic forces and institutions during different 
periods of time. I will then look more specifically at the dynamics of inequality within 
the labour market. After that I will say something about some structural inequalities, 
in terms of gender, race, caste and other dividing lines. Finally I will say something 
about the different ways in which state intervention tries to modify the outcomes in 
the two countries. 
 
Our starting point for this exercise can be summed up in Figure 1, which shows the 
long term trends in inequality in India and Brazil, as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
What we see is almost a mirror image. Inequality rose in Brazil from the 1960s to the 
1980s, peaked, and then started to fall, especially after 2000. In India, inequality 
showed little change until the 1990s. Actually the available evidence for earlier 
1 The members of the two teams, whose work provides the basis for lecture, have included Taniya 
Chakrabarty, Nandita Gupta, Ashok Pankaj, Janine Rodgers, Vidhya Soundararajan and myself, all at 
IHD, New Delhi; and Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, Maria-Cristina Cacciamali, Fabio Tatei and Ian 
Prates at Cebrap, São Paulo. References to some of the papers produced by the team, on which this 
lecture draws, are given at the end of the paper. 
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periods suggests that there was a slight fall from 1950 to the 1970s. Then inequality 
started to rise, especially from the end of the 1990s. This figure shows the Gini 
coefficient, which is only one measure of inequality, but other evidence points in the 
same direction – for instance Piketty and Banerji’s work on the income share of the 
top 1 per cent in India shows a fall in this share up to 1980, and a rise thereafter. 
 
Figure 1: Gini coefficients of household income (Brazil) and expenditure per 











Sources: India – National Sample Survey, various years; UN-Wider World Income Inequality database 
WIID V3.0B for earlier years (http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/); 
India Development Report, 2011 (IGIDR, Mumbai); and calculations from unit level data. 
Brazil - prepared by authors based on PNAD/F.IBGE data. 
Notes: Indian data refer to household expenditure per capita. Brazilian data refer to individual income. 
For 1980 to 1995 the Indian data relate to one or two years earlier than the date indicated in the figure. 
 
 
There is clearly a connection with the pace of economic growth here. The steepest rise 
in inequality in Brazil was during the high growth “Brazilian Miracle” period of the 
late 1960s and 1970s. And inequality in India started to rise when the growth rate 
accelerated in the 1990s. But the story is more complicated than that. Inequality in 
Brazil stayed high during a period of slow growth in the 1980s and early 1990s, and 
was declining steadily during a period of moderate growth after 2000. In India, 
inequality rose more slowly after 2004, when growth rates reached the peak of 9 to 10 
per cent, than between 1999 and 2004. It is not just the pace, but also the nature of 
growth. 
 
The other point in this figure is that it looks as though India has always been more 
equal than Brazil. But long term data for Brazil concern income, and long term data 
for India concern expenditure. Some data sources do permit you to compare 
inequality of income and of expenditure, such as the NCAER Human Development 
Survey. In 2004-05 the Gini coefficient for income inequality in India was almost 14 
points higher than for expenditure (Figure 2). This would virtually close the gap 
between the two countries in 2011 in Figure 1. 
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Figure 2: Gini index of inequality compared across different variables and 















Sources: NSS 61st round, unit level data (left hand two bars) and NCAER Human Development Survey 
2004-05  (right hand two bars).  
 
 
Notice, on the left hand side of the figure, that the Gini coefficient for wages alone is 
much higher than for household expenditure per capita in the NSS. In fact, for wages 
alone we can make a more direct comparison of inequality between Brazil and India 
over the last thirty years, because we have similar data for both. Figure 3 shows the 
Gini coefficients of wages for the two countries in rural and urban areas separately 
from 1983 to 2012.  
 






















Source: Brazil, prepared by the Cebrap research team on the basis of unit level data from the National 
household sample survey (PNAD); NSS,  prepared by the IHD research team on the basis of unit level 
data from the National Sample Survey, various rounds. 
Note: “1994-95” refers to the 1993-94 National Sample Survey and 1995 PNAD data. 2005 refers to the 
2004-05 National Sample Survey and 2005 PNAD data. 2011-12 refers to the 12011-12 National 




The results are quite clear. Wage inequality was lower in India than in Brazil in both 
urban and rural areas in the 1980s. But sometime between 1994 and 2005 the curves 
crossed, so that in 2011-12 inequality was higher in India than in Brazil. The pattern 
is sharper in urban than in rural areas, but present in both. There are a number of 
possible explanations for this urban-rural difference, which I will come back to, but it 
should be noted from the outset that it is easier and perhaps more legitimate to 
compare urban areas in Brazil and India than rural. Only 15 per cent of Brazil’s 
population is now rural, and much rural economic activity consists of large scale 
commercial farming – nothing like the small peasant farms that continue to dominate 
in India. On the other hand, urban habitats and economic structures have more in 
common between the two countries.  
 
Wage inequality is only one component of inequality. Even if we also measure 
inequality in income and expenditure, this is still not the whole picture. There is 
inequality in access to employment, capital or public resources; inequality in wealth; 
inequality of rights and recognition. We cannot cover all of these issues, in part 
because the data sources do not permit it. The lack of good information on wealth is 
particularly unfortunate, as Piketty’s recent work has amply demonstrated, because 
ultimately the inequality of wealth drives inequality of income. But even the analysis 
of a more limited range of indicators can tell an interesting story.  
. 
Growth Regimes and Inequality 
 
Inequality is embedded in social and economic structures and institutions. Drawing on 
the work of the French Regulation School (e.g. Boyer, 1994), which developed the 
notion of accumulation regimes, and also inspired by work in a “varieties of 
capitalism” tradition (Hall and Soskice, 2001), we made an attempt to characterize the 
pattern of growth in India and Brazil in terms of “growth regimes”. The underlying 
idea is that combinations of institutional forms give rise to different modes of social 
and economic regulation and a particular pattern of economic growth. Growth 
regimes are not predetermined, but reflect the intertwining of economics, politics and 
history.  
 
The key components of growth regimes, following (and expanding upon) Boyer, are 
• Type of integration in the international economy 
• The competition regime (monopoly, oligopoly and markets) 
• Wage labour relations and labour institutions 
• The agrarian system 
• The monetary and fiscal regime 
• The role of the state 
 
A growth regime may be stable for some period, but change eventually occurs 
because of its internal dynamics or contradictions, or because of external factors.  
 
This approach calls for a long term perspective. In both Brazil and India, we identified 
historical periods in which the pace and pattern of capital accumulation and growth 
were built around a particular set of political, economic and social institutions, and 
associated with a particular pattern of distribution. 
 
 5 
The framework that we have used is summarized in the following charts. In the case 
of India we have drawn on the work of De and Valulabharanam (2013), among others.  
 
Many of the institutions that we see in Brazil and India today have their roots in 
earlier periods. The institutions that were put in place in the period from the 1930s to 
the 1950s were particularly important in both countries, so we take that as a point of 
departure. Of course, many aspects of inequality, with respect to gender, race or caste, 
for instance, are more deep-rooted still.  
 
In both Brazil and India, and indeed in much of the world, the 1980s were a point of 
inflexion, so we need also to separate the pre-and post-1980 periods. Figure 4 shows 
how we characterize the growth regimes prior to 1980.  
______________________________________________________________ 
 




























Both countries embarked on a state-led development process in the mid twentieth 
century built around industrialization. Brazil had an extended successful period of 
import-substitution based industrialization, first – until 1955 – driven by state 
investment; then from 1956 built on partnership between the state and private capital, 
both domestic and foreign; and then, after the military coup in 1964, under an 
authoritarian regime which combined capital accumulation with repressive labour 
policies. This we present as three growth regimes, though it could also be seen as a 
single growth regime with three phases. The overall outcome was high growth, 
averaging almost 7 per cent per year from 1950 to 1980. By 1980 the secondary sector 
(including mining) accounted for over 40 per cent of GDP and 25 per cent of 
employment.  
 
In India, the initial phase of heavy industrialization after Independence was heavily 
dependent on public investment, which accounted for more than half of all investment 
by the mid 1960s. But industrialization faltered in the 1960s in the face of drought, 
war and the slow reduction of poverty. Populist policies after 1967 neither lifted the 
economy above the Hindu rate of growth of 3 to 4 per cent, nor significantly reduced 
poverty, and of course the second half of the 1970s was a period of political turmoil. 
In 1980 the secondary sector had reached only 23 per cent of GDP and 13 per cent of 
 6 
employment, and within this the share of manufacturing had hardly risen since the 
mid 1960s. In 1980 India was still a largely agrarian country, while in Brazil 
agriculture accounted for only 10 per cent of GDP. 
 
These different growth paths generated very different patterns of inequality. In Brazil, 
there developed a large urban proletariat, with a degree of social protection, but with 
weak bargaining power, especially under the military regime after 1964. Wage 
differentials widened and a substantial middle class also emerged.  At the same time, 
in a segmented labour market low productivity self-employment also grew. Wealth 
became increasingly concentrated. The result was the sharp rise in inequality that we 
note above. In India, in contrast, the urban/industrial proletariat remained small. The 
gap between this group and informal and rural workers widened, but there was no 
concentration of wealth at the top as in Brazil, indeed some transfer from the top 
towards the middle. As a result inequality did not worsen overall, but real wages for 
casual workers changed little, and poverty rates hardly fell.  
 
In 1980 Brazil looked at though it had put in place the foundation for continued rapid 
growth, while an improvement in India’s economic situation looked unlikely after the 
political and economic crises in the latter half of the 1970s. However, what actually 
happened was the reverse. The global recession at the beginning of the 1980s affected 
Brazil much more than India, for the former had grown dependent on volatile 
international capital flows and large export shares, while India was still quite 
autarchic. In Brazil the foreign debt burden grew, even as foreign direct investment 
dried up. Economic and political crisis fed on each other, with the implosion of the 
military regime, a collapse of industrial output and weak governments which were 
unable to control inflation. Growing unemployment, increasing informality and rising 
food prices hit the poor hardest, and inequality peaked at the end of the 1980s. The 
situation was brought back under control in the 1990s, but the combination of 
stabilization programmes with renewed liberalization in an open economy led to 
erratic and low growth. Nevertheless, a start was made on new social policies, 
minimum wages started to rise and inequality began to decline.  
 
 
Figure 5: Growth regimes in Brazil and India, 1980-2010 
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Meanwhile, India’s liberalization started in the 1980s, but initially consisted of a 
degree of domestic deregulation. In this transitional regime growth accelerated 
without a significant increase in inequality and poverty declined. But the more 
systematic deregulation after 1991 saw both increased growth and widening gaps in 
the labour market. Wages grew much more slowly than GDP and the wage share in 
modern industry declined.  Trade unions played little role, unlike in Brazil where the 
redemocratization process in the 1980s had also built a strong trade union movement. 
Nor were there any major innovations in social policy during this period.  
 
At the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s the differences between Brazil and India 
became even more apparent. The period up to 2004 saw a substantial increase in 
inequality in India, as the benefits of higher growth were concentrated. There was 
little progress in human development indicators in this period (Drèze and Sen, 2013), 
and only slow growth in household expenditure. Meanwhile, policies aimed at 
reducing inequality were strengthened in Brazil, especially after the election of a new 
government from 2002, which put in place a successful combination of rising 
minimum wages, more systematic social transfers, and the creation of formal jobs. In 
contrast, India’s growth created little formal employment. The share of manufacturing 
hardly changed, and instead growth was built on construction – largely employing 
casual labour – and above all a rapidly growing service sector, in which high tech 
services in particular generated much value added but few jobs.  
 
Nevertheless, after 2004 there was a clear shift in the inequality trend in India. 
Looking back at Figure 3, there was a notable fall in wage inequality in rural areas 
after 2004, while it continued to rise in urban areas. This may in part be due to a 
tightening of the labour market for casual labour as a result of high growth, and it is 
true that casual wages did start to rise in both urban and rural areas. But there is also 
evidence that NREGA also played a role by helping to set a floor to at least some 
rural wages.  But although the rise in inequality was stemmed after 2004 it was not 
stopped, which contrasts sharply with the Brazilian experience, where there was a 
steady decline in inequality up to at least 2012. 
 
The Labour Market 
 
Turning to the labour market, the pattern of growth prior to 1980 delivered rather 
different outcomes in the two countries. In Brazil most employment was urban by 
1980, and in urban areas a majority of wage earners were registered, meaning that 
they had some social security entitlements and other legal protections. This had its 
roots in the Getulio Vargas governments between 1930 and 1954, which built an 
institutional framework for the labour market, with an extensive labour code, labour 
courts, supervised labour contracts and a rather state-dependent trade union system. 
While labour rights were weakened during the military period after 1964, the 
institutional structure persisted. Informal and unregistered work was quite substantial, 
especially in rural areas and in small enterprises, but it did not dominate the labour 
market. In India, in contrast, while many urban workers were in regular work of some 
sort, only a minority was effectively protected by law or trade union organization, and 
there was a growing body of casual workers, especially in rural but also in urban 
areas. The substantial labour code that was put in place in the post-Independence 
period in practice only reached a small minority of workers. So although the growth 
regimes were quite different, in both countries labour markets were segmented, wage 
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labour relations were increasingly heterogeneous and there was a large informal 
economy. But the disadvantaged segment of the labour market accounted for a much 
greater share of all workers in India.  
 
We have more detailed information on the structure of segmentation since the 1980s.  
Figure 6 shows the evolution of three labour status categories in the three countries – 
registered or regular work, unregistered or casual work, and self-employment. 
 
This is a good point to make a comment on the difficulties of comparative analysis. 
Indian labour market data are generally broken down into regular and casual work 
status. Broadly speaking, these correspond to monthly and daily paid work, but these 
categories are in fact not always well defined.  In Brazil the usual breakdown 
separates workers with or without a signed labour card, which lays out workers rights 
and obligations. The concept of casual work is not in use in Brazil, and it is in fact 
quite difficult to translate it accurately into Portuguese. The nearest equivalent in 
Brazil is work without a signed labour card, or unregistered work, but this is by no 
means exactly the same thing as casual labour, since there is very little daily wage 
employment in Brazil. The category of regular work in India does not exactly 
correspond to registered work in Brazil either. Only about one third of regular work in 
India is formal, in the sense that there is a written contract and social security 
entitlements. In Brazil, registered work implies that there is a signed labour card, 
whereas in India much regular work is based on an oral agreement. The concept of 
self-employment is more similar in the two countries, but here too there are questions 
of how to treat unpaid family labour and subsistence activities.     
 
Despite these difficulties, it is useful to compare the trends in casual or regular work 
in India with those in registered or unregistered work in Brazil, because these are the 
basic segmentations of the labour market. As we can see in the following figures, 
there are some interesting differences in the experience of the two countries. Up to the 
end of the 1990s, there was little change in the share of registered or regular work in 
either country, with just some shift from self-employment to casual work in India 
which was not found in Brazil. But after 1999 the trends diverged. The share of 
registered/regular work rose in both countries, but much more steeply in Brazil. The 
share of unregistered/casual work fluctuated in India, but started to decline in Brazil 
after 2004-05. There was also a much sharper fall in self-employment in Brazil. Here 




Figure 6: Percentage of the occupied population in casual, regular and self-





































Sources: Unit level data from NSS and PNAD surveys 
 
 
The pattern in India reflects the persistence of a large rural sector, which cannot be 
directly compared with Brazil, which is mainly urban. If we take only urban areas in 
India, the pattern of employment is closer to that in Brazil, for regular work and self-
employment at least, but the difference in the trend after the turn of the century is just 
as large. The proportion of regular work in urban India is similar to that of registered 
work in Brazil but the share of the latter has been rising much faster. We should 
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however recall that much regular work in India does not have the protections of 
registered work in Brazil. 
 
How important are these segmentations for understanding the overall pattern of 
inequality?  One obvious indicator is the wage ratios between these different types of 
work. 
 
As Table 1 shows, here there is a difference between Brazil and India in both level 
and trend in these ratios. Casual wages in India average a little over one third of 
regular wages, and in urban areas the gap has hardly changed over the last thirty 
years; in rural areas there was little change until 2004-05, but then some increase in 
the ratio in 2011-12, perhaps reflecting the influence of the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in which the national minimum wage was 
normally to be paid. In Brazil, on the other hand, unregistered wages were half of 
registered wages in 1993, and the ratio has since risen steadily, reaching 68 per cent in 
urban areas. 
 
Table 1: Ratio of casual to regular wages (India) and unregistered to registered 
wages (Brazil), 1993-2012 
  1993-95 2004-05 2011-12 
India Rural 0.38 0.37 0.46 
Urban 0.36 0.36 0.37 
Brazil Rural 0.49 0.51 0.58 
Urban 0.50 0.60 0.68 
Sources: India – NSS; Brazil – PNAD. 
 
 
The wage differences are large, so this form of labour market segmentation is clearly 
an important contributor to overall inequality. One way of estimating the size of this 
impact is by decomposing wage inequality into the proportion within and between 
these different labour status categories groups. The Theil index of inequality is a 
convenient measure for that purpose. Figure 7 shows the percentage contribution to 
the Theil index of wage inequality of wage differences between casual and regular 
workers in India, and registered and unregistered workers in Brazil.  
 
What we see is first of all, that this segmentation is much more important in India 
than in Brazil, in both rural and urban areas. In 2011-12 it accounted for 12 per cent 
of the Theil index in urban areas and 24 per cent in rural areas in India, against 3 per 
cent and 16 per cent in Brazil respectively. However, in both countries it has been 
coming down. This is not so much because of the reduction in the gaps in average 
wages between casual and regular workers (as we saw, this is negligible in India) but 
rather because of increasing variation of wages within these categories, especially 
within regular and registered work, as occupations have diversified. Other evidence 
suggests, for instance, that the gap between technical and white collar workers and 
other regular workers has doubled in modern industry in India. This has not been 
nearly so visible in Brazil, because the rising minimum wage has pushed up the floor. 
 
These estimates only concern wage workers. We have much less information about 
the incomes of self-employed workers, in India at least. However, if we look at data 
on household expenditure per capita we find that self-employed workers are roughly 
midway between casual and regular workers in India, whereas in Brazil they are 
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relatively better off, and with expenditure levels comparable to those of registered 
wage workers, on average. 
 
Figure 7: Percentage contribution of labour market segmentation to Theil index 




















Sources: Calculated from unit level household surveys; India – NSS; Brazil – PNAD. 
 
 
These patterns reflect the impact of labour market institutions and trends in the 
growth path – in short, the overall growth regime. If the situation of casual workers is 
not improving in India, while that of unregistered workers in Brazil is, then this surely 
reflects the greater effectiveness of trade unions in Brazil, a wider scope for collective 
bargaining, more effective minimum wage policies, and efforts in other fields such as 
regional policy and education.  
 
So labour market segmentations play an important role in inequality in both countries. 
And of course the simple two-category breakdown used here only captures some of 
the factors involved. Formal production systems use informal workers through 
outsourcing and other means, and there are large variations in wages, employment 
security, protection and vulnerability in both formal and informal work.  
 
Above all, there are many other deeply embedded sources of inequality in the labour 
market in each country, including sex, caste, race and unequal access to education and 
skills, which structure the process of segmentation, giving rise to complex patterns of 
inequality and exclusion. I cannot possibly do justice to all of these factors in a short 
lecture, but let me comment on a few interesting patterns. 
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Divides and Cleavages 
 
Gender  
Let me start with gender. One of the most striking differences between Indian and 
Brazilian labour markets is the degree of gender inequality. Figure 8 shows the labour 
force participation rates of adult men and women in the two countries since 1980. 
Over that period, female labour force participation has been rising steadily in Brazil, 
while in India it has been constant or falling.  As a result it is now twice as high in 
Brazil as in India.  
 
Figure 8: Labour force participation rates (%) of men and women, aged 15+, 


















Source: ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Markets, 8th edition (Geneva, ILO), tables 1a and 1b,  
 
 
The second difference is in the structure of employment. In India, women are 
concentrated in agriculture; in Brazil, they are concentrated in services. This is also 
true of men, but to a much lesser extent. In rural India both men and women are much 
more concentrated in casual work than in Brazil, but there is more similarity in urban 
areas. There are more women in wage work in urban Brazil, but the share of regular 
or registered work has been rising for women in both countries, and it is almost as 
high for women as for men, and almost as high in India as in Brazil. Of course the 
absolute numbers of regular women workers are lower because female labour force 
participation is so low.  
 
The increase in regular work also leads to a rising wage ratio between woman and 
men. Detailed wage distributions suggest that more women are gaining access to 
better paid regular work in India, and this increases average wages. But wage 
differences in casual work persist. Figure 9 shows the share of wage inequality in 
urban areas (percentage of the Theil index) explained by gender differences for 
different labour status categories. It can be seen that in India wage differences 
between men and women continue to be an important factor in inequality in casual 
work (although declining), while they have a negligible impact in unregistered work 
in Brazil. In contrast, while gender differences are less important in regular work in 
both countries their effect is larger in Brazil. In both countries there is a “sticky floor” 
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effect, reflecting the tendency for women to receive low wages in casual or 
unregistered work, and a glass ceiling; but the former is more important in India, and 
the latter is more important in Brazil. 
 
Figure 9: Decomposition of the Theil index of wage inequality by sex and 






















Source: calculated from unit level data, NSS and PNAD. 
 
 
This is just one aspect of a complex issue. But these results do suggest that there is an 
important difference between the two countries in the way gender inequality works in 
the labour market, especially in better jobs. In India the issue is opportunity and 
access. Only a minority of women gain access to the labour market, but once access to 
a decent job is obtained, there is relatively less discrimination. In Brazil, opportunity 
and access is much more open; but discrimination and differentiation seem to be more 
important within the labour market. We observe this for gender inequality; but we 
also observe it for race and caste, which I will look at, briefly, next. 
 
Race and caste 
The idea that you can compare race or skin colour in Brazil with caste and community 
in India is often contested, and it is quite obvious that these are social constructs with 
totally different historical origins and symbolic interpretations. Nevertheless, when 
studying labour market inequality there are some significant common elements. Both 
provide mechanisms for labour market differentiation based on observable personal 
identity, and both are associated with hierarchies of income and social position. Both 
are extremely persistent, because of their social embeddedness. And both forms of 
hierarchy are officially rejected, and efforts are made to overcome them. 
  
Without going into this issue in any detail, some simple indicators give an idea of the 
dimension of this type of inequality. The most obvious comparison is between non-
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whites and whites in Brazil, and Scheduled Castes and Tribes against all others in 
India. Table 2 shows the wage ratios. Two interesting points emerge. The first is that 
the wage ratio in 2011-12 is of the same order of magnitude in the two countries. The 
second is that while in Brazil the situation of the non-whites has been improving 
steadily over time, in India the situation of Scheduled Castes and Tribes has shown 
only marginal improvement. 
 
Table 2: Wage ratios between non-whites and whites (Brazil) and between 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes and all others (India) 
  1993-95 2004-05 2011-12 
Brazil Rural 0.62 0.76 0.80 
Urban 0.54 0.61 0.66 
India Rural 0.76 0.72 0.79 
Urban 0.68 0.67 0.70 
Sources: NSS, PNAD 
 
 
What is the contribution of these differences to overall inequality? To answer that 
question we need to also capture wider differentiation in India. The estimates in 
Figure 10 are based on the following groups in India: Scheduled Castes, Scheduled 
Tribes, Hindu OBC, Muslim OBC, other Muslim, other Hindu and other religion. To 
illustrate the patterns we look at urban registered or regular work. 
 
Figure 10: Contribution of race (Brazil) and caste/community (India) to the Theil 
















There are several interesting points to make here. The first is that these factors 
account for a significant share of wage inequality, from 5 to 12 per cent. Second, for 
men there is not much difference between Brazil and India, but for women the impact 
is much greater in India. Third, in both countries there is a tendency for the impact to 
decline, more so in India than in Brazil. This would seem to contradict the evidence 
on wage ratios, but these include all workers, casual and regular, and it turns out that 
the pattern is different for casual or unregistered work. I don’t have time to go into 
these issues in more detail here, but the clear conclusion is that these stratifications 
remain important factors in labour market inequality. 
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A multivariate analysis 
There are many other dimensions of inequality, and each needs to be considered 
separately. However, to give a general picture it is useful to look at the results of a 
multivariate analysis of wage inequality, bearing in mind that such an analysis is built 
on a considerable simplification of the impacts of each factor.  
 
For this purpose, we use the decomposition method developed by Fields (2002). A 
simple Ordinary Least Squares regression of the determinants of log wages is 
conducted on various worker characteristics such as age, education, social group, 
industry of work, etc. The coefficients obtained from this regression are used to 
calculate the contribution of each of these characteristics to the overall observed 
inequality of wages. The base of this approach is therefore the standard earnings 
functions which are common in the labour economics literature. 
 
For this decomposition we used the following characteristics of the individuals 
concerned in the two countries: 
• Age 
• Sex 
• Type of wage work (regular or casual in India; registered or unregistered in 
Brazil ) 
• Education (six categories for India and five categories for Brazil) 
• Region (five regions identified in each country) 
• Socio-religious group (the in India was as follows: Scheduled Caste, 
Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, other. In Brazil white and non-white were 
distinguished). 
• Industry (standard 1-digit) 
• Occupation (standard 1-digit) 
• Rural-urban residence 
 
We report the results for 2011 (Brazil) and 2011-12 (India) in Figure 11. This figure 
presents the distribution of the explained portion of the decomposition across the 
different variables. The proportion explained is very similar in the two countries: 
50.1% in Brazil and 51.1% in India. This is a very respectable level of explanation for 
an analysis using large household surveys, since there are always important 
interpersonal variations between individuals which cannot be captured by these 
standardized models, as well as unknown but probably significant errors of 
measurement, which will introduce random variation into the data. 
 
 16 
Figure 11: Fields multivariate decomposition, India 2011-12, Brazil 2011.  










































Source: prepared from unit level NSS data for India by Vidhya Soundararajan and from unit level PNAD 
data for Brazil by Fabio Tatei.  
 
 
The first comment to make is how similar these patterns are in the two countries. In 
both countries the largest explanation comes from education, followed by occupation, 
followed by work type. In both countries industry and social group have only small 
effects. The main differences concern gender – much more important in India, age – 
much more important in Brazil – and rural-urban differences, much more important in 
India. 
 
Taking the results variable by variable, starting from the top, age is quite important in 
Brazil, reflecting the larger size of the modern sector where there can be significant 
career progression. The much greater importance of gender in India was already noted 
earlier on. It is significant that this does not disappear in the multivariate analysis – in 
other words, the gender effect is not just an education or occupation effect, but seems 
to reflect real discrimination or differentiation. Work type – casual/regular or 
registered/unregistered – somewhat surprisingly is more important in Brazil, but is 
large in both. Education then makes the largest contribution.  In both countries it 
accounts for over 30 per cent of the explanation of wage inequality, slightly more in 
India. Regional differences are more important in Brazil, but note that to adequately 
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reflect regional diversity in India we would need more that the 5 regions identified 
here, so its real impact is probably greater. The surprising result is the small effect of 
social group, actually larger in Brazil. This suggests that, unlike for gender, there is 
not much direct wage discrimination. In this analysis the breakdown of social group in 
India is quite limited (SC, ST, Muslims and others) but the small contribution to 
inequality is still contrary to expectations. It is nevertheless consistent with the earlier 
suggestion that discrimination in India operates more at the point of entry to 
employment than in wage differences of those in work.  
 
It is notable that industry is much less important than occupation. Similar analyses for 
previous periods suggest that the importance of occupation has in fact been rising 
over time, as the economy diversifies, and this trend is stronger in India. In fact 
occupation should be considered in conjunction with work type, since many 
occupations typically fall within one or other of the labour status categories (white 
collar workers are mostly regular; unskilled labour is casual). Occupation and work 
type together account for about 34 per cent of the explanation in India, and almost 40 
per cent in Brazil. Finally, rural-urban differences, as expected, are more important in 
India.  Separate rural and urban analyses, not reported here, suggest that there is more 
difference between rural and urban areas in the pattern of explanation in each country 
than there is between the two countries overall. 
 
In both countries, the largest contribution comes from education. This is in line with 
the common conclusion that investment in education is an effective way to reduce 
inequality. However, this model does not take into account that access to education is 
also unequally distributed, and so is not truly independent of some of the other 
variables. In particular, the low direct effect of social group may be substantially 
increased by an indirect effect coming through the unequal access to education of 
non-whites in Brazil and lower castes and Muslims in India.  
 
The State and Inequality 
 
What role has intervention by the state played in these outcomes? Obviously many 
dimensions of inequality are embedded in labour market structures or social relations. 
But the state acts, directly or indirectly, to support particular interests, promote 
opportunity or redistribute resources. 
 
This is something that can be best understood within the broader framework of the 
growth regime. In Brazil, the economic structures and institutions put in place by the 
state in the 1940s and 1950s provided protection and security for a growing industrial 
working class, but generally failed to reach rural areas until the 1970s. The goals were 
mainly those of conventional social security, along with the expansion of health and 
education systems, but many groups were excluded from “social citizenship”, and 
redistribution, in the form of social assistance, was not an important goal. This is one 
reason why inequality grew sharply under the repressive military regime in the 1960s 
and 1970s, which was allied with both domestic and foreign capital, and built its 
support on a growing national middle class. During this period the state in India was 
explicitly socialist in orientation, but without the means to reach the population as a 
whole. Because of the preponderant role of the state in production there was less 
scope for benefits to be concentrated in private hands, and limited land reforms along 
with populist programmes in the 1970s, and some measures to protect industrial 
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workers (including minimum wages and protection against dismissal), directed some 
resources away from the rich, though not necessarily towards the poor. However, in 
some sense poverty was shared. 
 
It is these broader forces, rather than specific policies, which explain the divergent 
trends in inequality in the two countries. This was also true after 1980, when there 
was a clear shift in the ideological frame in both. In India the coordination between 
the state and private capital strengthened in the 1980s, ultimately leading in the 1990s 
and 2000s to a much reduced intervention of the state, both in terms of public 
investment and in terms of effective regulation. This was an important factor in the 
shift from wages to profits in organized industry, and the strengthening of market 
forces also increased differentiation within the labour market. In Brazil democratic 
forces reasserted themselves in the 1980s, and the 1988 Constitution, which coincided 
with the peak of inequality, laid out a wide range of rights and entitlements. 
Nevertheless, the 1990s saw a strengthening of liberalization, as in India – in both 
cases, of course, responding to the international political economy as much as to 
domestic forces. The centrist government in power in Brazil from 1994, hamstrung by 
an overhang of debt, put in place some new mechanisms for redistribution but in a 
context of economic recession and austerity.  
 
After 2002 in Brazil and 2004 in India a political reaction led to the election of 
governments with greater social commitment, more so in Brazil where the Worker’s 
Party, brought to power with trade union support, put in place a series of policies to 
redistribute resources to the poor, while maintaining relatively conventional macro-
economic policies. In India a less coherent political coalition led by the Congress 
party introduced a number of social policies, including a 20 per cent increase in the 
real national floor minimum wage (which however stagnated in real terms thereafter) 
and above all the national rural employment guarantee scheme, but without directly 
threatening the private interests that had developed under liberalization. The result in 
India was to moderate the rise in inequality, while in Brazil the decline in inequality 
initiated under the previous government accelerated. 
 
Any assessment of policies to reduce inequality has to be placed within these wider 
political settings, because success or failure depends less on the technical 
characteristics of the policy than on the political environment in which it is 
implemented. 
 
But beyond the political economy at any point in time, there are also rather 
fundamental differences in approach to social policy between Brazil and India, 
differences which in part derive from the power and orientation of the state, but which 
are also embedded in the ways public policy is conceived. These too condition the 
success and failure of policies in particular domains and directly affect the capacity of 
the state to influence inequality. 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental is the size of the state and the resources which it 
devotes to social policies. In India, between 1990 and 2007, social sector expenditure 
accounted for around 6 per cent of GDP, rising thereafter to about 8 per cent in 2013. 
In contrast, in Brazil, total public social spending accounted for between 15 and 20 
per cent of GDP in the first half of the 1990s, rising to 22 per cent in 2002 and 27 per 
cent in 2009. So in relative terms, Brazil devoted three times as much to social policy 
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as India. This is of course to some degree a question of overall resource availability, 
since Brazil’s GDP per capita was higher, but the increase in India since 1990 was 
small if compared with the large increase in GDP. This is a primary constraint on state 
redistribution. 
 
Second, Brazil has laid a foundation of conventional social security (pensions, health 
insurance, accident insurance, unemployment insurance, social assistance) which 
delivers important transfers to lower income groups.  Social security of this type 
exists in India, but only for a small fraction of the working population. Instead, India 
has developed a series of programmes aimed at particular needs – the Public 
Distribution System for food security, Indira Avaas Yojana for housing needs, 
pension programmes for widows or the disabled, etc. More recently, large scale 
redistribution has been based on conditional cash transfers in Brazil – Bolsa Familia, 
Bolsa Escola – and these have played an important role in reducing inequality (30% 
of the recent decline in the Gini coefficient could be attributed to cash transfers 
according to recent estimates). While there is some move towards cash transfers in 
India, they are mainly seen as ways to improve the efficiency of specific programmes, 
rather than a universal means of redistribution. 
 
Third, in Brazil social policy has since the 1988 constitution tended to be universal, at 
least in principle, while in India it tends to be targeted. Social security is a case in 
point. Much social policy in India, and in particular the programmes listed above, is in 
principle aimed at a “Below Poverty Line” population, and a regular exercise attempts 
to identify the population concerned on the basis of various and changing criteria. In 
Brazil there are income cut-offs for access to some benefits, but the underlying 
principle is usually one of universal access. This is changing in both countries today 
as “rights-based” policies (food, education) gain traction, but this is not yet the 
dominant practice in India. The underlying logic is of course that targeted transfers 
should help avoid leakage and reduce costs. 
 
An important example of particularism concerns reservation policies. The reservations 
for particular castes of a percentage of public sector jobs, and more recently of 
admission to public sector educational establishments, is one of the main instruments 
in India aimed at reducing inequality. Policies of this type are much less in evidence 
in Brazil, where preference is given to broader based programmes to raise 
qualifications, for instance. The political visibility of these policies in India has made 
them central elements of any strategy for redistribution, though they seem to be rather 
ineffective ways of redistributing resources, since large gaps between Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes and others remain more than 60 years after these policies were first 
put in place. 
 
Fourth, in India the primary goal of redistributive policy is generally expressed as 
poverty reduction, rather than the reduction of inequality. Indeed, it is widely argued 
that provided poverty declines it is unimportant if inequality increases. There is little 
traction in India for the idea that poverty is relative in nature, and that poverty and 
inequality are closely interconnected. In Brazil, in contrast, while poverty reduction is 
an important target, and has given rise to major policy approaches such as the “Zero 
Hunger” initiative, the reduction of inequality is also seen as a valid goal in its own 




Fifth, there is in India a much greater focus on employment creation as a means of 
reducing poverty (and implicitly inequality). This is most apparent in the reliance on 
public works programmes of various sorts, most recently MGNREGA, as the vehicles 
to transfer resources to the poor.  This tradition is almost absent in Brazil. 
Employment creation is of course on the agenda in Brazil, but mainly through 
attempts to promote private sector employment creation, notably in small enterprises.  
 
Sixth, in both countries labour market intervention is seen as one ingredient of 
redistributive policy, but much more explicitly in Brazil, where the minimum wage 
has in recent years been playing an important role in reducing labour market 
inequality. Although it could play the same role in India, this is undermined by weak 
implementation. 
 
Seventh, the role of social movements is different in the two countries. The organized 
trade union movement is much stronger and more influential in Brazil; but NGOs 
have played an important part in designing and influence policy in India, notably 
promoting rights-based policies and MGNREGA, 
 
These differences in framework and philosophy make it rather risky to make direct 
comparisons between the effectiveness of particular policies in the two countries, for 
a policy instrument that works in one setting may well fail in another. But there is 
another factor – that clusters of policies need to be seen together. There is, for 
instance, a tendency for Bolsa Familia in Brazil to be compared with MGNREGA in 
India as means for transferring resources to the poor and reducing inequality.  But 
Bolsa Familia works in a context where there is a wider social security system, with 
particular family structures and educational opportunities, trade union organization 
and legal protections in the labour market. MGNREGA operates in a rural context 
with seasonal unemployment where other social security instruments are lacking and 
legal protections are weak, but there is a Public Distribution System providing food 
subsidies, housing programmes, reservation policies and other local policies. Clearly 
it is the set of policies as a whole that needs to be compared, even if they are not 
designed as a coherent whole. The reality is that efforts to reduce inequality are only 
likely to be successful where a package of complementary policies is put in place. In 
Brazil, the foundation of declining inequality in the last fifteen years or so was rising 
minimum wages, the large scale creation of formal employment, transfers through 
Bolsa Familia and a variety of local policies concerned with education, training and 
other areas. In both countries it can also be seen that different policy instruments 
affect different parts of the income distribution. Cash transfers, wage policies, 
education policies, employment policies and effective labour market regulation do not 
reach the same populations, so multiple measures of inequality are needed to capture 
and compare their impacts. 
 
We must not use the word inequality as if its content were obvious. It takes different 
forms. We have focused on economic inequality – in terms of wages, incomes and 
consumption levels – but this is only part of the story, for there is inequality in wealth, 
in security, in capability, in prestige, in power… in happiness… Nor is it simple to 
characterize inequality. We reduce it to summary measures such as the Gini 
coefficient, but in fact we may be interested only in how well people do at the bottom 
or the top, compared with the rest. For instance, it often is argued that the primary 
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concern will be to ensure that everyone reaches a certain standard of economic 
welfare (so we are concerned with the bottom of the distribution), without regard to 
what happens at the top.  
 
In this debate the contrasts between Brazil and India help to show what is specific and 
what is general. The divergences help to identify proximate causes and correlates. The 
similarities may point to more systematic, wider influences which are felt beyond 
these two countries.  
 
And finally, what about the future? Brazil is presently in economic and political crisis, 
its economic model is questioned, and it is by no means sure that the present, 
equalizing growth regime will continue. But the shape of any new growth regime is 
very unclear. India too may be at a turning point, for its economy is increasingly 
dependent on an uncertain world economy, and growing inequality is likely to raise 
social and economic tensions and become a threat to continued growth. But whether 
this situation can be overcome is another story. 
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